Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) (Winograd and Flores, 1987; Akrich, 1992) , which involves both learning and innovation processes. In order to answer our question we present a case study of the Tibia (http://www.tibia.com) and an ongoing anti-cheating campaign. In the conclusion of the paper we provide some general reflections on the relevance of the economy of cheating to Virtual Worlds research.
In this paper we adopt an emergent approach, in particular following some of the methodological principles proposed by Callon (1986) , to study how different actors understand cheating within a game and to establish how cheating in MMORPGs shapes economic practices in the real world. In particular we focus on one cheating practice, that of botting 3 : the use of computer programs to automate several game tasks (so called bots) in violation of End User License Agreements of games. Specifically, we seek to provide a qualitative account of the socio-technical dynamics (the how) of this phenomenon (Garfinkel, 1967; Latour, 2005) . This paper is based on an ongoing case study of the MMORPG Tibia (http://www.tibia.com) and focuses on the struggle between its developer and publisher CipSoft-which tries to regulate game players-some of whom wish to be able to use bots and some of which do not, and external cheating companies aimed at exploiting player demand for bots. It is a dynamic story that involves learning processes and incremental innovations such as new software tools, including cheating software,s well as new models of governance for the regulation of players' behavior. Our conceptualization of cheating in MMORPGs as an economy is based on ongoing qualitative data analysis of Tibia gameplay and Internet forum discussions where we observed that some cheating practices, such as developing, selling, and using bots, are productive and can lead to value creation in the real world.
This paper consists of a brief critical review of the relevant literature on cheating in online games, followed by a discussion of our research methodology, the findings from our empirical research on cheating, learning and innovation practices surrounding Tibia, and finally some general conclusions for understanding cheating and its relationship to the economy of Virtual Worlds.
Cheating in Online Games in a Nutshell
In our investigation of the practice of botting in MMORPGs we follow an approach in which cheating is conceptualized in both technical and social terms (Latour, 1988) . In particular we cut across the distinction between social and technical, and we assume reality to be hybrid, composed of a mixture of the two. In this regard our working definition considers cheating as the result or outcome of the relationships between many interleaved social and technical elements (including cheating software, the security design issues, negotiations among players, game companies anti-cheating activities, anti-cheating tools, and in general everything that relates to cheating). We consider our approach, conceptualizing cheating as a socio-technical process, to be useful for the goal of this paper, insofar as it will allow us to investigate the economy of cheating in MMORPGs without operating any a priori reduction to either the technical or the social (Latour, 1988) or making a judgment that cheating is either good or evil (Latour, 1987) . However, our approach is substantially different from current literature on cheating in MMORPGs that, in most cases, assumes a strong distinction between social and technical aspects of cheating.
Cheating in games is indeed often just described as a practice which is detrimental to the spirit of fair play and provides unfair advantages to cheaters. A mainstream definition of cheating comes, for example, from Yan and Choi (2002) and states that cheating is "Any behaviour that a player may use to get an unfair advantage, or achieve a target that he is not supposed to" (p. 126). Hoglund and McGraw (2007) even suggest that "Cheats come closest to actual crime when they are used to make a great deal of money. " (p. 8) . Common examples of cheating in online games include practices such as exploiting bugs and weaknesses in the game design, the use of macros and software to manipulate the game code either directly or indirectly,or even the direct manipulation of other players' trust and social expectations. While the definition of cheating we present here captures some of the elements of this phenomenon; it does not, however, account for all the complexity of cheating in online games. In fact, cheating appears to have a mobile and permeable boundary which is not always easy to define (Consalvo, 2007) . Moreover, cheating phenomenology varies according to different games, technologies, motivations, and outcomes (Yan and Randell, 2005) .
A further problem in the definition of cheating lies in the differences between the way it is treated in computer science literature as opposed to social or media literature. Most of the technical or computer science-oriented literature on cheating in online games defines it as detrimental to gameplay. The advantages obtained by using cheating techniques are not supposed to be achieved by players (Yan and Choi, 2002) . In most cases, it is also said that cheating is due to poor (sometimes non-existent) security design (Yan and Randell, 2005) . In this way, such literature reduces cheating to a technological problem: solving the technical limitations of security design will lead to a fair game. Anti-cheating techniques, as formalized in computer science literature, are supposed to contribute to the achievement of this ideal fair game. Examples of anti-cheating techniques include the use of CAPTCHA 4 to detect 'bot' users (Golle and Ducheneaut, 2007) , anti-cheating protocols (Di Chen and Maheswaran, 2004) , techniques for preventing software client modifications (Mönch et al., 2006) , and techniques used to detect cheats in real-time games (Ferretti and Rocetti, 2006 ).
We are not saying that the computer science or technical approach to cheating in online games is necessarily wrong but we feel that it is limited, to the extent that it is one-dimensional and tries to reduce cheating to a technical or security design problem. In this regard we feel that media scholars and game-studies scholars provide a richer approach by pointing out that cheating is a multidimensional problem, and one which is the subject of conflict among different groups.
For example, Fields and Kafai (2009) describe the case of an educational website where teenagers were able to engage in complex learning activities which included the discovery of smart cheats for solving casual 5 science games. By conceptualizing cheating as a form of learning, Fields and Kafai provide an example of how the reduction of cheating to a technical problem is clearly a limited approach. Another example is Smith (2004) , in which cheating in online games is described as 'extra-mechanical conflicts' (together with, for example, norms violations or grief play 6 ) that are the direct consequences of the social spaces created by these games. This is as opposed to 'intra-mechanical conflicts' (for example the conflict that arises when one plays against another in a first-person shooter game), which results directly from the game rules (results explicitly from its design) and are therefore not disruptive. The work by Smith shows that cheating relates to the complex social space generated by these games. A further contribution to the debate on cheating is made by Kücklich (2007 and , who has suggested using cheating as a methodology to explore non-obvious aspects of digital gameplay, including its machinic/cybernetic processes: an approach that he defines as deludology.
The study by Consalvo (2007) constitutes perhaps the main example of how media studies conceptualize the multidimensionality of cheating. Indeed, for Consalvo (2007) cheating in online games is something that gets culturally negotiated by players, cheaters, and the anticheating industry, and she seems to suggest that a single definition does not help in understanding its cultural and dynamic character. In this regard Consalvo notices that often what is at the centre of the players' negotiations are what she calls 'soft rules', or in other words those game rules that do not depend directly on the game code (the so-called 'hard rules') and that "can be broken more easily than the game code" (p. 87). Consalvo's work takes into account not only social and cultural dimensions but also, in part, the technological dimensions. For example, the whole of Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the different cultural attitudes existing in the anticheating industry and an analysis of different anti-cheating strategies. Although we recognize some links between our work and that of Consalvo, and its influence on our own conceptualization of cheating, we are of the opinion that more empirical research will need to be done in order to better frame how cheating is practiced in MMORPGs.
In conclusion it is our opinion that media and game-studies literature on cheating goes in the opposite direction to computer science literature. In media research, cheating is described as negotiated and permeable and is also often reduced to social or cultural elements. When reading media literature it is also not uncommon to recognize the specific implication that cheating can be evidence of player power and resistance. Therefore what we have in the literature on cheating in online games is a continuum that goes from a purely technology-focused world (the lack of security design) to a purely social world, whereas both ends of the continuum grasp some aspects of the phenomenon of cheating.
The Theory and Method of Our Research: An Emergent Approach
Our approach to the study of cheating in MMORPGs emphasizes the accounts that are provided directly by the actors themselves: the various cheating companies, their customers, game developers and publishers, and finally how non-cheating players see and define cheating. Moreover, we include as actors how game design, cheating and anti-cheating software, and licenses enter into the picture as active elements of concrete negotiations. In doing so, we follow an important research tradition that relates to the phenomenology of technology, ethnomethodology and Actor-Network Theory (see in particular Garfinkel, 1967; Callon, 1986; Winograd and Flores, 1987; Akrich, 1992; Latour, 2005) .
In particular we adopt the principle whereby the observer does not decide in advance the social and technical attributes of the technological system (or virtual world in our case). Instead, we consider the attributes to be ethnomethods (Garfinkel, 1967) that emerge from the negotiations surrounding the virtual world. Ethnomethods are native conceptions, terminologies, explanations, and in general methodologies used by the actors to make sense of the world they inhabit. These native conceptions and methodologies are epistemologically opposed to those of a possible (and fictional) external scientific observer educated in the relevant scientific domain (Lynch, 2007) . This also implies that the observer is required to not impose or implement in advance a theory to explain or understand ethnomethods. Michael Callon (1986) describes this emergent approach as follows: "the observer must consider that the repertoire of categories which he uses, the entities which are mobilized, and the relationships between these are all topics for actors' discussions. Instead of imposing a pre-established grid of analysis upon these, the observer follows the actors in order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the different elements by which they build and explain their world, whether it be social or natural." (pp. 200-201) .
According to Akrich (1992) , one of the key methods for approaching the problem of how the actors build and explain their world is to focus on the moments of rupture that occur in the "natural flow of things," and in particular on those situations in which devices and technologies go wrong. The author observed that we need to focus on disputes around technological or device failures as the crucial moments that reveal the actors' activities and ethnomethods. Winograd and Flores (1987) , in their pivotal work on the design of computer artifacts, proposed the specific term breakdown in order to capture these moments of rupture. During breakdowns, the objects that populate the world we inhabit (again, often technological systems-think about your car or your laptop) and that we take for granted (and that therefore lie unobserved in the background) become particularly evident or present to us as they become the subjects of controversies, negotiations. and adjustments. Indeed, when technological devices break down, actors become aware of their presence and importance, and most importantly, they undertake a series of actions to fix the broken devices. It is therefore during breakdowns that we, as observers, can be direct witnesses to the actors' efforts to bridge and solve the ruptures. In other words, the concept of breakdown provides us with a concrete way of approaching the 'how' of the economy of cheating as ethnomethod: something that reveals its fundamental traits and attributes during the disputes and negotiations around the technological aspects of cheating practices.
As described before, a key element of this approach is to focus on the relevant social groups in innovation processes. Users are in many cases one of these groups. The role of users in the innovation process is a focus for researchers from evolutionary economics to science and technology studies to media studies (Edquist, 1997; Woolgar, 1991; van Oost, et al., 2009 ). In the innovation process, users can have indirect roles (through, for example, market research) or more direct roles (for example, usability testing and participatory design). Their tacit layman's knowledge can provide important inputs to the innovation process,but can also lead to its failure. Another relevant social group in innovation processes is that of technology designers and technology builders in general, whose task is often to inscribe patterns of use in the technologies they create, hence envisioning a possible evolution of society (often referred to as a 'script', see Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1987) through technological means.
The data in this paper draws upon a virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000) of the game Tibia, the official Tibia forums, and the forums of cheating companies who develop bots for Tibia 7 . This paper draws in particular on the forum threads directly related to an anti-cheating campaign launched in early 2009 and discussed both on official Tibia forums (a total of 379 threads) and on cheating companies' forums (a total of 442 threads) 8 . The data gathered from the forums was supplemented by participant observation within Tibia and included the creation of a character that was played for at least six hours each week on a PvP server 9 since February 2009. Game play has enabled us to interact with players, understand the gameplay's dynamics, and understand the use of language and terminology in the game 10 .
Our mixed method approach allowed us to capture spontaneous discussions and negotiations on the forums 11 and to understand these in relation to gameplay. In terms of data analysis, our approach followed that proposed by Latour (1988, p. 10) which suggests that one follow the 'storytellers' (i.e. the main actors and groups) and how they attribute causes, endow entities with qualities or classify actors, in line with what was previously described. This approach enables us to provide a dense account of how the actors and relevant groups themselves describe the world they inhabit (their ethnomethods), without trying to impose a predetermined grid of analysis. In this paper we present forum messages and other data produced by the Tibia storytellers (Cipsoft the Tibia developer, the cheating companies, and the players both cheaters and honest ones). These data have been selected as illustrative examples of the wider and ongoing activities related with the key disruption of the existing stable market relationships between cheating companies and cheaters, occurred at the beginning of the anti-cheating campaign.
The process of research and analysis of the Tibia case study is ongoing, and while in this paper we follow closely the approach proposed by Latour we are also, in the current phase, conducting a Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006) to the main forum threads and documents (including Tibia legal documents and official articles). With Grounded Theory the theory emerges thorough a recursive and inductive iteration between data and theory. Thus, this paper provides an overview of one part of a much larger project which we hope will contribute a great deal more to the empirical and theoretical understanding of cheating in MMORPGs.
The Case of Tibia and the Cheating Companies
Tibia is a 2D medieval fantasy MMORPG that was first released in 1997. Tibia is played on more than 70 servers located in Germany and the USA, with an estimated total subscriber base of 300,000 players, 100,000 of which have premium accounts (CipSoft, 2008) . In Tibia there are two types of accounts: free and premium, and one player may have several accounts. The price of a Premium account varies depending on the length of the period paid for. Currently, buying a Premium account for 12 months costs EUR 4.99 per month, whereas only one month costs EUR 7.45. Premium accounts benefit from additional advantages compared to Free accounts, including, for example, premium areas that cannot be accessed with a Free account, a large number of abilities for premium characters, large storage spaces for items, and also the possibility to become the leader of a guild, something that is not allowed for players with Free accounts.
Although Tibia does not possess powerful 3D graphics such as those you can find in other MMORPGs, its role-playing elements and the Player Versus Player features are what make it attractive to players. Tibia players can choose among four different types of roles (called vocations) that include Knights, Paladins, Sorcerers, and Druids. A character's vocation determines her characteristics in many ways, which it would not be possible to describe here in just a few words. The different vocations allow different types of gameplay, especially concerning attacks and combat with both monsters and other characters. Knights, for instance, are stronger in using 'melee' items (such as swords or axes) and are therefore more powerful in close combat. On the other hand, Druids are stronger in casting spells and healing. In Tibia, players can engage in different role-playing activities, including quests that can be solved by a single player, or by forming a team of players composed of characters with different vocations. The killing and looting of Tibia monsters is certainly one of the main activities of the game, since this provides 'experience points' that enable a character to make progress in the game rankings. Another relevant feature of the role-playing in Tibia is that players can form guilds and take part in wars among these guilds. The rewards for winning a guild war lie in the ability to exercise forms of domination over a server, as powerful guilds are regarded as having "more influence on the events and politics in a world than any single player could possibly have, and few will be foolish enough to mess with a member of a strong guild" (CipSoft, 2009b) . Guilds can rent houses in the game cities and create their own headquarters where characters belonging to the same guild can meet; in these houses players can also store items or restore lost points faster, after losing them in fights. Tibia was chosen for this case study on cheating because CipSoft, the company that develops and distributes the game, started a campaign against cheaters at the beginning of 2009. Since then Tibia players have experienced mass bans of cheaters, changes in regulations, and the introduction of new software (including both cheating and anti-cheating tools). In Tibia, cheaters, especially so-called 'botters', were considered quite widespread by the player community, which had asked CipSoft several times in the game forums to take action to solve the problem 12 . 'Botting' is the practice by which a player uses an external computer program, known as a bot, to automate certain gameplay tasks. These 'bots' operate via "artificial intelligence routines pre-programmed to suit the game map, game rules, game type and other parameters unique to each game" (Computer Game Bot, 2009). As in many other MMORPGs, Tibia players must perform certain actions such as killing and looting monsters in order to acquire special items or virtual currency, or to increase their ranking and levels. In most MMORPGs, accumulating items and currencies and leveling up a character 13 can be a long and 12 See for example this long thread in which players asked for the deletion of cheater accounts: http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=1978162 13 'Levelling up' means enabling a character to move to a higher level of competence, which gives him/her more value in the game.
time-consuming process (Kolo and Baur, 2004) , which many players find tedious. Killing and looting monsters are indeed often repetitive and boring activities, and bots can assist or even totally replace the players (so called Away From Keyboard play, or AFK) in performing these tasks (Golle and Ducheneaut, 2005) . As Joshi (2008) mentioned, bots can run forever without getting bored or tired like human players.
CipSoft has never directly asserted the possible relationships between its revenue and the campaign against cheaters/botters. However, on the game forums several players declared their intention to stop paying for their Premium game accounts because of the presence of cheaters. It is also clear that the use of bots has a direct influence on gameplay, the negative impact of which is clearly perceived by fair players in many ways:
For too long, the botters have ruined our economy, our society, our enjoyment of this game. We the few, the noble, the honest stand here before CipSoft today and demand a change.
(From http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=1978162&pagenumber=99 Post #19615799, July 18, 2008) Therefore CipSoft's anti-cheating campaign is probably a response to complaints made on the forums 14 by many within the player community about the spread of cheaters, and to player requests for a stronger policy against cheaters. A manifesto article that summarizes the company's anti-cheating strategy states:
In short, we do not want cheaters in Tibia. We are of the opinion that they directly destroy the economy and have a negative influence on the peaceful gameplay of fair players. (CipSoft, 2009a) On the other side, two cheating companies, BlackD and NGSoft (which operate within the law in their home countries), are well known to Tibia players for providing bots, and they sell licenses for their bot programs in exactly the same way as any commercial software company does. Their programs include several different bots (BlackDProxy, elfbot, TibiabotNG), all of which offer different types of cheating features. The price of the bot license varies depending on the number of computers on which the bots are used and the length of the purchase period 15 To counter them, the ongoing anti-cheating campaign by CipSoft has included the mass banning of game cheaters' accounts (one mass ban per month since the end of January 2009, with approximately 5,000 accounts being affected each time), new anti-cheating tools, and changes to the game's regulatory policies. During this period one of the most talked-about moves was the introduction of an anti-cheating tool. Anti-cheating tools are software devices that automatically enforce the rules contained in the End User License Agreement (EULA) or the Terms of Service. Consalvo (2007, ch. 6) identifies and describes three different types of tools 17 : (1) tools that seek to prevent cheating (for example by the mean of encrypted communication between server and clients), (2) tools that seek to render cheating ineffective (for example by disconnecting the cheater once detected) and finally (3) tools that seek to detect the use of third party software (such as bots) that tamper with software clients 18 and that, as an outcome, allows game companies to ban the cheaters on the basis of the detection. The anti-cheating tool introduced in Tibia is of this third type and aims to detect unofficial software used to play the game. One of the mass bans (April 2, 2009) carried out by CipSoft was announced on the forums as: In this message CipSoft clearly emphasizes that the banning action was undertaken on the basis of information on the use of unofficial software gathered by the anti-cheating tool. This same emphasis is also placed on the banning messages sent to cheaters and displayed on players' accounts, as the following figure shows. The new automatic anti-cheating tool clearly interferes with both the practices of cheaters and the business of the external cheating companies. Indeed, the campaign against cheating and the introduction of the anti-cheating tool are elements that change the current configuration of the situation: it is a real moment of breakdown for cheating companies. Before this anti-cheating campaign, it was common knowledge that using bots in Tibia was easy. On the official game forums several players, in different threads, described the plague of the diffusion of botters on game servers and in hunting areas 19 . Meanwhile, on the cheating forums cheaters shared images--or even videos--of what they called projects: the creation of powerful main characters (the projects) leveled up by using bots 20 . The introduction of the anti-cheating tool has, however, radically modified the situation for cheating companies and cheaters and has broken the existing stable market relationships between these groups. It is especially clear that these relationships were strongly based on the ability of bot programs to remain undetected. This breakdown has also lead cheating companies to declare their ambition to develop a new detection-safe version of their bots as a way to re-stabilize market relations with their customers. Thus, the development and deployment of an anti-cheating tool--and the resulting breakdown--have triggered a new process of learning and innovation for both cheating companies and cheaters.
Cheating as a Supply and Demand Relationship
CipSoft introduced the first mass ban at the end of January 2009, one month after the publication on their website of the manifesto article describing their new anti-cheating strategy. This mass ban was unexpected by all concerned: honest players, cheating players, and cheating companies. Many honest players described the bans and the introduction of the anti-cheating tool as a good starting point in the campaign against cheaters. By contrast, for the cheating companies the mass ban constituted a serious threat to their cheating business, while cheaters have often described the new situation as the end of botting. After the mass ban many bot customers were particularly worried about the new situation. What follows is an example, among many, taken from a cheating forum:
I did not get banned i'm merely pissed off at LoW claiming its safe, its a fucking hoax that works only because you're a bunch of brainless monkeys.
(From http://forums.tibiabot.com/showthread.php?t=111778 Post #9, February 9, 2009).
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In this message a customer complains to LoW (Lord of War, who we take to be one of the owners of the cheating company NGSoft) about his claims that the use of bots is safe, despite the mass bans and the introduction of the anti-cheating tool. After the mass bans many bot customers became afraid to use these programs when playing Tibia, as the following example demonstrates: Although many other cheaters declared their will to continue to use bots despite the mass bans, it is also clear from the above message that cheaters were facing a challenging situation. In 19 See for example this discussion: http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=1978162 20 See for example this discussion: http://www.blackdtools.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=47. 21 This message comes from a thread that has been removed from the forum by the cheating company. Indeed, several threads have been removed by the administrators of the forum and appear to be accessible only with administrative rights. All the data presented here and not available online can be received by specific request to the authors of this paper. 22 This thread has been officially removed from the forum by the cheating company. What is reported here is the original URL. See footnote 21 for an explanation. particular they had to decide whether to continue botting or not. What follows is a poll that was launched on one of the cheating forums after the first mass ban, which asked "Are you botting?" Although this poll does not have statistical validity, it shows (in the last line) that almost one third of respondents (34/107) declared that, at the time of the poll, they were not using bots as consequence of the first mass ban. The introduction of the anti-cheating tool has changed the relationship between cheating companies and cheating players: botting went from being a safe and rarely punished activity to a very dangerous activity, with a high risk of being banned. It is clear that many players are still botting but just over a third are not, and if CipSoft further increases the risks for players this could lead to a decrease in the demand for bots and consequently a decrease in revenues for cheating companies. However, this new configuration of things is also what triggers new dynamics in cheating companies' business practices, since they need to respond to changes in customer demand: 
Cheating as a Learning Process -Player/Firm Interactions
One of the key issues of this story is that the cheating companies do not know how the CipSoft anti-cheating tool operates, and this creates a problem for the development of new undetectable bots. This is not just an accident; it appears to be part of the CipSoft strategy, as the following message by a Tibia Community Manager shows:
Concerning the speculations and rumours about our automatic tool:
We won't comment on all those speculations since any hint would only help cheat tool developers and cheaters. Likewise, we won't reveal or discuss our criteria. (From http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=2478964&pagenumber=29 Post #22067302, February 2, 2009) So, as a general strategy against cheating companies, CipSoft does not want to reveal anything about the anti-cheating tool. For cheating companies, however, in order to meet the new customer demand for undetectable bots it becomes essential to acquire some knowledge of how the anti-cheating tool works. Fields and Kafai (2009) describe how cheating in online games is often a learning process in which cheaters collectively learn how to use cheats. In the case of Tibia, the cheating companies and players who are their customers are involved in a collaborative learning process, and there is a clear relationship between cheating and learning. We have a process through which real software companies, helped by cheating players, try to learn how an anti-cheating tool works. The goal of their learning process is to develop a way to defeat a cheating counter-measure: the CipSoft anti-cheating tool. On the Tibia cheating forums this learning process is pursued by making deductions based on the behavior of the game client (after the tool's introduction), or based on the companies' and cheaters' knowledge of computer systems. What follows is a forum post by the cheating company BlackD that describes what the company owner calls a possible 'theory' on how the anti-cheating tool works: It is interesting to see how cheating is a socio-technical process that involves a learning process, in which various technological elements (for example installed programs, APIs, calls to functions) form cheating business practices. In this case BlackD guesses that the anti-cheating tool operates by searching for well-known strings (such as bot programs' installation names) on users' computers. If these strings are found, then the tool will report this information to CipSoft. As we can see, cheaters with technical knowledge (people who can read hex and know the API) are invited by the cheating company to contribute to this learning process and provide knowledge to confirm/refute this theory. What follows is an example of this learning process, with a cheater providing some feedback as to the inner activities of the Tibia client:
It is also possible that Cip changed some server packets (1 byte is enough I believe) and updated the client to use the new packets...so when the bot uses the old packet, account is logged and banned.
(From http://www.blackdtools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=35800&page=5 , Post #45, January 30, 2009)
Here we see how cheaters contribute to the learning process. In this example, the cheater assumes that the tool checks communication packets between the client and the server and that CipSoft has slightly changed some packets so that detecting the tampering activities of bots becomes easy. What follows is a second 'theory' on the inner workings of the anti-cheating tool, again proposed by BlackD:
THEORY 2: they search strings "blackd" "ng" "elfbot" in your chat logs (private or not) If string is found more than 10 times in the log of the last 6 months then that would be "enough" proof and you get an automatic ban. (From http://www.blackdtools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=35800, Post #1, January, 30 2009) In this case the company proposes the idea that the anti-cheating tool scans the players' chat logs searching for known strings (for example "blackd" or " tibiabot") related to bots. The idea is that if a player has written certain strings several times in the chat while communicating with others players (see Figure 6 for an example that clarifies this point), in a given period of time, then this is detected by the anti-cheating tool. The decision to ban cheaters will be based on checking this information. What follows is a comment by a cheater on a possible reason why this proposed second theory is not correct:
Theory two doesn't work because I have said such things thousands of times in tibia and no banishment.
(From http://www.blackdtools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=35800&page=5, Post #45, January, 30 2009) In this case we have a positive deduction based on the consideration that the cheater has used the strings numerous times in chats but he/she has not been banned. On the contrary, what follows is a negative guess:
The second theory has to be false... I was banished but I didn't talk about bots ingame. (From http://www.blackdtools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=35800&page=7, Post #61, January, 30 2009) The second theory is therefore contradicted by the consideration that cheaters got banned even if they had never used those strings in the chat while playing the game. The evidence gathered and presented above would lead us to agree with Fields and Kafai that cheating can be conceptualized as a learning process. However in our story, the focus of the learning process is not on playing and winning the game, but rather on learning how the anticheating tool functions and how it detects the cheating software: the process is as social as it is technological. It is also crucial to see how this learning process involves close interactions between cheating companies and the cheaters that are invited to contribute to the learning process. In other words, cheating companies try to mobilize external human resources for their technical knowledge of the game client and the gameplay, in their goal of creating a new generation of bots.
Cheating as Part of an Innovation Process
Cheating in Tibia results in multiple and ongoing innovations by a range of different actors. CipSoft's anti-cheating campaign since January 2009 has involved the introduction of two innovations: the anti-cheating tool and new governance policies. These have forced the cheating companies to start a process of research and development which is resulting in incremental product innovations (a new generation of bots) to combat the anti-cheating tool. For the cheating firms, this process involves them gathering feedback from players about their use of cheating products in the marketplace, and about competing technologies, and subsequently using this information to assist in the development of new cheating technologies. Thus the cheating firms are not just involved in an information-gathering and learning process, they are also involved in a highly iterative innovation process to develop new software products and thus maintain their business.
For cheating companies the innovation process is attempting to do two things: develop undetectable bots and reassure customers so as to stabilize relationships with them. The following message by NGSoft clearly aims to reassure those customers who have become afraid to use bots because of the mass bans, and predicts the creation of a new generation of undetectable bots: In fact new versions of bots were released shortly after the first mass ban (January 30, 2009), incorporating several enhancements that were supposed to counteract the anti-cheating tool. These enhancements included for example several forms of randomization of gameplay actions in order to make the bot acting more like a human player, or the removal of bots installation names from the client machines 27 . These incremental innovations were also based on the information provided by cheaters via public forums. Interestingly, the first mass ban has been followed by others (one each month since January 2009, with approximately 5,000 accounts banned each month 28 and more than 45000 accounts banished in total so far). These subsequent bans constitute a dynamic situation in which the new bots were being tested in the marketplace. For example on BlackD forums, cheaters were asked by the company to provide feedback on characters created after the first mass bans and played with the new stealth bots: As we can see, the company makes an explicit request to its customers: to create new characters and to play them with the new version of the bot. This explicit request is made because deletion information might have already been gathered for characters that were played with bots before the (first) mass ban and before the introduction of the anti-cheating tool. On March 03, 2009, CipSoft carried out a second mass ban. While many cheaters reported that their newly created characters were not banned in this second wave, some did report banishments, as the following case clearly exemplifies: The new enhancements to the BlackD bot, introduced after the first mass ban, were therefore not effective. In March, after the second ban, the company BlackD was still declaring on its website that the use of bots was safe and that they were still working on a stealth approach. However, at the beginning of April, after a third mass ban, the advice from the cheating companies changed, as the following message demonstrates: 28 For some players the impact of each mass ban is relatively low, accounting for only 2-3 botters banned each day in each server (5000 accounts / 74 servers, with therefore an average of 68 accounts banned on each server in a month), see http://forum.tibia.com/forum/?action=thread&threadid=2712834 29 This thread has been removed from the forum too, see footnote 21. What is reported here is the original URL with the date of publication. 30 This thread has been removed from the forum. The URL provided is the original. See footnote 21.
YES I GOT BANNED WITH ONE. Created AFTER the proxy improvements
So far, therefore, the incremental technological innovations developed by the cheating companies do not appear to have generated the required result, and cheaters are being given specific advice on how to use bots. In particular, the company BlackD has invited cheaters not to use bots for their main characters. Instead, BlackD has suggested that the bots might be used for secondary characters (gold farmers) that can subsequently transfer their loot to the main character. It is clear that having a main character banned from the game because of cheating is a major loss for cheaters, whereas risking a ban on a secondary character--created with an account different from that of the main character--is sometimes an acceptable risk.
In any case it is clear that so far no secure and undetectable bot (a stealth bot) has been created and that the use of bots in Tibia remains a very risky activity for cheaters. At the moment cheating companies appear to have lost their fight against the Tibia anti-cheating tool, and cheaters are being banned on a regular basis by CipSoft and the tool. Therefore, while cheating companies have been innovating as an answer to a mutation in market demand from their customers, they may not succeed in the marketplace.
The Economy of Cheating in MMORPGs: Reflections for Virtual Worlds Research
In this paper we have explored how one form of in-game cheating (botting) can lead to innovations in the real-world economy, and how these innovation processes are triggered by a mutation of conditions in a marketplace. We think that this paper provides a useful contribution to our understanding of the relationship between virtual worlds and the real economy, insofar as it has unveiled and described an 'underground' economy and its socio-technical practices. In particular the adoption of an emergent approach based on ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005) has proved to be a promising avenue for this type of qualitative investigation into virtual worlds. While we are unable to quantitatively assess the extent of cheating in the game, this approach allows for an in-depth assessment of particular sociotechnical practices over time and accords equal status to the different perspectives of a range of actors.
In the case of Tibia what we have is a clash between the business of a MMORPG company and the business of cheating companies. Indeed, this case study reveals that cheating companies do their business 'just' within the boundaries of the Tibia game. The business of developing and marketing bot programs that tamper with game clients exists because the MMORPGs exist. In particular this study has shown that cheating innovation is a dynamic and productive process which is based on research and knowledge-acquisition activities as well as on incremental results based on market testing. Cheating innovations in Tibia are a collaborative process of learning and knowledge-development which increasingly takes place in sociotechnical networks, rather than purely internally in companies, and involves a range of social and technical factors. Therefore, in this study we have tried to unveil both how cheating can be productive in a very real sense and also to show the underlying socio-technical complexity of the relationship between cheating companies, their customers, and Tibia.
In this case study we have described how cheating companies have faced a breakdown in their business and how these companies have tried to cope with this breakdown and with the subsequent user demand for undetectable bots. As Callon (1999) pointed out in his contribution to the study of the market as a socio-technical phenomenon, responding to this kind of rupture requires a new configuration, a new framing, of the existing network of socio-technical relations: this is necessary because a certain amount of work has to be done and investment made in order to make relations calculable again. And indeed the breakdown introduced by the anti-cheating tool has required cheating companies to work towards the reshaping of a new set of relationships among themselves, their customers, and their products in order to re-frame a certain order and stability. The concrete answer to the breakdown is the creation of a new generation of bots with stealth capabilities, totally secure from detection by the anti-cheating tool. The goal of this technology (the stealth bot) is to recreate a new set of stable market relationships between the cheating companies and the bot customers. So far, however, this innovation and the new generation of bots have not been successful and CipSoft's anti-cheating campaign seems to be effective in counteracting certain types of automatic cheating in Tibia.
At a more general level, while cheating conveys an unfair advantage to some players in virtual worlds, it can also be said to generate productive activities and value in the real economy. In the case examined in this paper cheating generated the production and ongoing innovation of anti-cheating and botting tools. Castronova (2005) , in his inquiry into the social and economical dynamics of synthetic worlds, has pointed out that MMORPGs have important implications for labor markets and for the creation of revenues. Complex economies are behind--and embedded in--these games, and they create jobs and wealth in ways that were perhaps unexpected and largely not understood. In our opinion cheating companies that focus on MMORPGs constitute an unexplored dimension of how MMORPGs can generate revenues and labor markets. By saying this, we do not mean to justify the existence of any cheating business that creates jobs and revenues. However, it is important to recognize that cheating companies such as those described in this paper operate exactly as 'normal' software companies do. These companies sell cheating software on the real-world market in exactly the same way as any other software companies: users need to pay a license fee for limited use and on a limited number of machines. In our opinion, the activities of producing, selling, and using cheating software to tamper with game clients or to intercept server-client communications--in contravention of the games' EULAs--are not justifiable per se. However this position cannot deny the empirical evidence that there is a complex economic dynamic in place. In particular, as we have seen, we have companies that have a business, we have customers that demand innovative products, and in general we have networked market dynamics that emerge at the boundaries of MMORPGs. Therefore some forms of cheating practices, such as developing, selling, and using bots are productive processes that lead to value creation in the real world. We are convinced that a better understanding of the productive nature of cheating may lead to more acceptable solutions to the problem of cheating in MMOPRGs for all the actors involved.
